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Abstract: In this paper we investigate the relation between auditor 
independence, audit committee quality and the disclosure of internal 
control weaknesses. We begin with a sample of firms with internal control 
weaknesses and, based on industry, size, and performance, match these 
firms to a sample of control firms without internal control weaknesses. Our 
conditional logit analyses indicate that a relation exists between audit 
committee quality, auditor independence, and internal control weaknesses. 
Firms are more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness, if 
their audit committees have less financial expertise or, more specifically, 
have less accounting financial expertise and non-accounting financial 
expertise. They are also more likely to be identified with an internal control 
weakness, if their auditors are more independent. In addition, firms with 
recent auditor changes are more likely to have internal control 
weaknesses. 
Keywords: internal control weakness; audit committee financial expertise; auditor 
independence. 
1. Introduction 
Firms are more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness, if their 
audit committees have less financial expertise or, more specifically, have less 
accounting financial expertise and non-accounting financial expertise. They are also 
more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness, if their auditors are more 
independent. In addition, firms with recent auditor changes are more likely to have 
internal control weaknesses. 
Independent audit committees and audit committees with more financial 
expertise are significantly less likely to be associated with the incidence of internal 
control problems. Material weaknesses in internal control are more likely for firms that 
are smaller, less profitable, more complex, growing rapidly, or undergoing 
restructuring. Firms with more complex operations, recent changes in organization 
structure, auditor resignation in the previous year, more accounting risk exposure, and 
less investment in internal control systems are more likely to disclose internal control 
deficiencies. In addition, we document that auditor independence is an important 
determinant of internal control weaknesses.  8
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2. Background and hypotheses 
2.1. Background
Internal control is defined as a process, effected by an entity’s board of 
directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the achievement of objectives, according to the COSO framework
1.
Management must disclose significant internal control deficiencies, when they certify 
annual financial statements. Specifically, the signing officers, being responsible for 
internal controls, have evaluated the internal controls and reported in their findings: (1) 
a list of all deficiencies in the internal controls and information on any fraud that 
involves employees who are involved with internal control activities; (2) any significant 
changes in internal controls or related factors that could have a negative impact on the 
internal controls. Management not only provide an assessment of internal controls, but 
also auditors provide an opinion on management’s assessment.  
Most of the internal control weakness disclosures are related to financial 
systems and procedures. This group typically involves financial closing processes, 
account reconciliation, or inventory processes. For example, one company disclosed 
problems with ‘‘the design and effectiveness of internal controls relating to receivables 
from suppliers’’. Personnel issues rank as the second largest category of weakness 
disclosures. This category is related to the poor segregation of duties, inadequate 
staffing, or other related training or supervision problems. For example, other company 
cited a ‘‘lack of sufficient personnel with appropriate qualifications and training in 
certain key accounting roles.’’ Other common types of weaknesses include revenue 
recognition, documentation, and IT system and controls (e.g., security and access 
controls, backup and recovery issues). In addition, issues related to international 
operations and mergers and acquisitions are sources of weakness disclosure, although 
they represent a relatively small percentage of all disclosures. 
Based on their severity, these internal control problems are classified into three 
types: material weakness, significant deficiency, and control deficiency. Auditing 
Standards defines a material weakness as ‘‘a significant deficiency, or combination of 
significant deficiencies, that results in more than a remote likelihood that a material 
misstatement of the annual financial statements will not be prevented or detected.’’ 
Under Auditing Standards, a significant deficiency is ‘‘a control deficiency, or a 
combination of control deficiencies, that adversely affects the company’s ability to 
initiate, authorize, record, process, or report external financial data reliably in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles such that there is more than a 
remote likelihood that a misstatement of the company’s annual financial statements that 
is more than inconsequential will not be prevented or detected.’’ A control deficiency 
occurs ‘‘when the design or operation of a control does not allow management or 
employees, in the normal course of performing their assigned functions, to prevent or 
detect misstatement on a timely basis.’’ For the sake of brevity, we will refer to material 
internal control weaknesses as internal control weaknesses hereafter. 
                                                     
1 COSO stands for the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission9
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2.2. Audit committee quality and internal control 
Since an entity’s internal control is under the purview of its audit committee, 
we investigate the relation between audit committee quality and internal control 
weaknesses. The audit committee not only plays an important monitoring role to assure 
the quality of financial reporting and corporate accountability, but also serves as an 
important governance mechanism, because the potential litigation risk and reputation 
impairment faced by audit committee members ensure that these audit committee 
members discharge their responsibilities effectively. We thus expect that firms with 
high-quality audit committees are less likely to have internal control weaknesses than 
firms with low-quality audit committees. 
On measuring audit committee quality, we focus on the financial expertise in 
these committees. It is recommended that each audit committee have at least one 
financial expert highlights the importance of the financial literacy and expertise of audit 
committee members. Such financial expertise of audit committee members has been 
shown to be important for dealing with the complexities of financial reporting and for 
reducing the occurrence of financial restatements. In addition, audit committee 
members with financial reporting and auditing knowledge are more likely to understand 
auditor judgments and support the auditor in auditor-management disputes than 
members without such knowledge. Moreover, financially knowledgeable members are 
more likely to address and detect material misstatements. Audit committee members 
with financial expertise can also perform their oversight roles in the financial reporting 
process more effectively, such as detecting material misstatements. Indeed, there is a 
significantly negative association between an audit committee having at least one 
member with financial expertise and the incidence of financial restatement. Audit 
committees with financial expertise are less likely to be associated with the incidence of 
internal control problems.  
Hypothesis 1. Firms with greater audit committee financial expertise are less likely to 
have internal control weaknesses.
Audit committees with accounting financial expertise improve corporate 
governance. Therefore, we further separate audit committee financial expertise into 
accounting financial expertise and nonaccounting financial expertise and test the 
relation between these two variables and internal control weaknesses. 
An audit committee member is a financial expert if he or she can be classified 
into the following two categories:
(a) an accounting financial expert who has experience as a public accountant, 
auditor, principal or chief financial officer, controller, or principal or chief accounting 
officer;
or
(b) a non-accounting financial expert who has experience as the chief executive 
officer, president, or chairman of the board in a for-profit corporation, or who has 
experience as the managing director, partner or principal in venture financing, 
investment banking, or money management. With this definition, we measure audit 
committee financial expertise as the percentage of audit committee members who are 
financial experts. We further separate audit committee financial expertise into 
accounting financial expertise, measured as the percentage of audit committee members 
who are accounting financial experts, and non-accounting financial expertise, the 
percentage of audit committee members who are non-accounting financial experts. 10
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2.3. Auditor independence and internal control 
Auditor independence can be related to the disclosure of a firm’s internal 
control problems. When there is a strong economic bond between an auditor and a 
client firm, the auditor has an incentive to ignore potential problems and issue a clean 
opinion on the client firm’s internal controls. While some studies find no relation 
between non-audit fees and auditor independence and argue that an auditor’s concern 
with maintaining its reputation for providing high-quality audits could restrain it from 
undertaking activities that jeopardize independence, since the revenue from each client 
will be a small percentage of the auditor’s total revenue, other studies suggest that the 
provision of non-audit services compromises auditor independence. Non-audit services 
are associated with increased discretionary accruals and the achievement of certain 
earnings benchmarks. For example, the abnormal returns for Andersen’s clients around 
Andersen’s indictment are significantly more negative, when the market perceived the 
auditor’s independence to be compromised. Given these mixed empirical findings, we 
measure auditor independence as the ratio of the audit fee to the total fee, and propose 
the non-directional null hypothesis, as follows. 
Hypothesis 2. Auditor independence is not associated with the disclosure of internal 
control weaknesses. 
2.4. Control variables 
2.4.1. Audit committee 
In addition to audit committee financial expertise, other attributes of an audit 
committee have been found to be important factors in effective monitoring. 
Specifically, we control for audit committee independence, there is a positive relation 
between audit committee independence and the quality of internal control. An audit 
committee member is independent, if he or she is not affiliated with the firm and does 
not accept any consulting fees. 
We next control for the natural logarithm of audit committee size, measured as 
the number of audit committee members, because research suggests that a large audit 
committee tends to enhance the audit committee’s status and power within an 
organization. We thus expect that a large audit committee is more likely than a small 
one to improve the quality of internal controls, because increased resources and 
enhanced status will make the audit committee more effective in fulfilling its 
monitoring role. 
We also control for the natural logarithm of audit committee meetings, 
measured as the number of audit committee meetings held each year, because research 
shows that effective audit committees meet regularly. However, it is also possible that 
an audit committee meets more frequently to discuss internal control issues, when there 
are significant problems associated with a firm’s internal controls. Therefore, we make 
no prediction on the relation between the number of audit committee meetings and the 
quality of internal controls. 11
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2.4.2. Board of directors 
The quality of an entity’s internal controls is a function of the quality of its 
control environment that includes the board of directors and the audit committee. First, 
we focus on board independence, measured as the percentage of outside directors on the 
board
2, because research suggests that board independence is negatively related to the 
likelihood of financial fraud. We also control for the natural logarithm of board size, 
measured as the number of directors on the board. While some researchers find that a 
large board has more expertise than a small one, that it tends to be more effective in 
monitoring accruals, others suggest that a small board is more effective in mitigating 
the agency costs associated with a large board. Given the mixed empirical evidence on 
board size, we expect that the relation between board size and the likelihood of internal 
control weaknesses is indeterminate. Finally, we control for the natural logarithm of 
board meetings, as measured by the number of board meetings held each year. While 
board meeting frequency is important to improve board effectiveness, it is inversely 
related to firm value, because of the increased board activities following share price 
declines. Since board independence, size, and meeting frequency all influence a board’s 
effectiveness, they, in turn, are related to the quality of internal controls. 
2.4.3. Auditor types 
We use a dummy variable (BIG4) to measure auditor type, because a firm’s 
decision to hire a Big 4 auditor is likely to be associated with internal controls for 
several reasons. Smaller and less profitable firms are more likely to have internal 
control problems than larger or more profitable ones. On the one hand, such firms with 
internal control problems are less likely to hire a Big 4 auditor, because they are 
constrained by financial resources and cannot afford it. On the other hand, they might 
also be avoided by the Big 4 auditors, because they are perceived as being risky and 
may expose the Big 4 to potential litigation. Given that a firm shunned by a Big 4 
auditor may signal that it has potential internal control problems, we introduce the 
dummy variable BIG4 to control for auditor quality. 
2.4.4. Auditor changes 
Firms with recent auditor changes are likely to have internal control problems. 
On the one hand, auditors may drop risky clients as part of their risk management 
strategies, since firms with material internal control weaknesses may represent high 
audit failure risk. On the other hand, firms may dismiss auditors for lack of 
performance, when the firms discover material internal control weaknesses. 
2.4.5. Other variables 
We also control for firm characteristics that may be associated with internal 
control problems. Small and high growth firms are likely to have internal control 
weaknesses, we control for size, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets (TA), 
and growth, measured as industry-median-adjusted sales growth. It may take some time 
for a firm that recently engaged in mergers and acquisition to integrate different internal 
control systems; consequently, such a firm is more likely to have internal control 
problems. A firm experiencing restructuring is also likely to have internal control 
                                                     
2 Outside directors are those who are not affiliated with the firm, other than serving on its board.12
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problems, because of the loss of experienced and valuable employees and because of 
the dramatic changes associated with such an event Also, firms with greater complexity 
and scope of operations are more likely to have internal control problems than those 
without.
3. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the relation between audit committee quality, auditor 
independence, and the disclosure of internal control weakness. 
The results from our conditional logit analyses suggest that a relation exists 
between audit committee quality, auditor independence, and internal control 
weaknesses. Firms are more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness, if 
their audit committees have less financial expertise or, more specifically, have less 
accounting financial expertise and non-accounting financial expertise. They are also 
more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness, if their auditors are more 
independent. In addition, firms with recent auditor changes are more likely to have 
internal control weaknesses. 
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